day with a myriad of diagnostic challenges, mostly small, sometimes large, as our patients come to us with their puzzling symptoms and signs. Multiple times each day, we must say to them-or at least to ourselves-that it is probably this, or we aren't sure, or we don't have the foggiest idea.
Part of the problem is, of course, our cognitive inadequacy. As psychologists have amply and repeatedly demonstrated, the judgments and decisions of physicians (like those of other people) are based largely on our intuitions (Daniel Kahneman's System 1). 1, 2 We look for patterns, learn quick rules of thumb, base our confidence on ease of retrieval and coherence (not always on accuracy), 3 and may substitute easy (but less relevant) judgments for difficult ones. We have limited capacities of attention and have trouble seeing what we are not looking for, 4 but we also tend to maintain coherence by ignoring or distorting information that does not support our initial hypotheses. [5] [6] [7] Indeed, looking at the long catalogue of our biases, 8 it is easy to forget that, mostly, we do quite well.
Kahneman and Gary Klein 9 argue that the conditions for the reliability of expert intuitions are 1) the stability and regularity, and hence the predictability, of the environment; 2) the time and opportunity for experts to learn the whole set of relevant cues; and 3) the availability of useful feedback about their judgments and decisions. Do these conditions exist in primary care? Only to a limited degree. First, even the common complaints and illnesses of our patients are full of variations, complexities, and misleading clues. We are told (with good reason 10 ) to pay close attention to patients' histories, yet psychologists stress the fallibility of even vivid memories. 4 Second, the whole set of relevant cues is vast and difficult both to learn and to retain, given the limitations of our own memories. Since PCPs are inundated by what is common, it seems likely that, over time, the uncommon disease patterns will become harder to retrieve, and PCPs will become more susceptible to premature closure; hence, it is not surprising that several studies have found that experience provides little or no improvement in diagnosing uncommon conditions. 11, 12 Third, PCPs get some feedback on their diagnostic judgments, but not systematically. Most things, whatever they are, get better or go away; specialists and hospitals do not always communicate well; and we are likely to be defensive about our errors rather than learning from them.
In this context, we should consider both the Institute of Medicine's (IOM's) comprehensive 2015 report on improving diagnosis and reducing diagnostic error 13 and the article in the current issue of Medical Decision Making by Olga Kostopoulou and colleagues. 14 The IOM report looks at all aspects of the diagnostic process and its context. Kostopoulou and colleagues focus on what they see as a key moment, the initial hypothesis formulation.
Kostopoulou and colleagues 14 studied the reasoning of family physicians in the United Kingdom through online simulated consultations. They looked for indications that the physician noted the subtle signs of cancer in a patient's first or second consultation. The major lesson of the study-that if you don't think of it, you won't look for it and may not see it when it shows itself-is of course not new. But the authors quite cleverly provide evidence in support of it. They found that physicians were 5 times more likely to recommend management that might lead to a diagnosis of cancer if they appeared to think initially about cancer as a possibility.
We do not know from their study why some physicians thought of cancer initially and others did not. Did the poor performers have a deficit in knowledge about cancer (i.e., an insufficient store of cancer patterns to retrieve), or did they have, as a personality trait, a tendency to think narrowly? Conversely, we do not know if those who did mention cancer or take steps that would lead to its discovery were more likely, in their clinical practices, to cast widely and order large number of tests, thereby potentially harming patients and wasting resources (not ''choosing wisely'').
Kostopoulou and colleagues 14 give us a specific focus in trying to improve diagnostic judgments, the initial hypothesis generation. The IOM report 13 and the review by Pat Croskerry and colleagues 15 give us a whole range of recommendations. The overriding problem is the paucity of evidence that any of these suggestions will have a significant impact in actual clinical practice. 16, 17 Nonetheless, since PCPs are used to interventions that help only occasionally or to a small degree-for example, trying to help patients to stop smoking or lose weight-I will list those suggestions that make sense to me as a PCP.
First, we need to stimulate PCPs to acquire and maintain a broad knowledge base, that is, a cognitive store of patterns and scripts of rare but important as well as of common diseases (the field of action of our intuitions). Thus, future PCPs should, I think, continue to have major exposure to those patients who end up in tertiary care hospitals and in the offices of super-specialists; they will have many years to learn about common illnesses. In addition, despite evidence of limited effectiveness, continuing medical education and board recertification should force PCPs to review and relearn what they almost never see in their daily practices.
Second, we need to reduce PCPs' cognitive load, particularly when interpreting the results of diagnostic tests. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, physicians, as well as others, have trouble thinking in a Bayesian fashion. 18 Presenting information in terms of frequencies rather than probabilities may be helpful; in one experiment, it increased from 21% to 87% the percentage of physicians who assessed correctly the impact of a positive mammogram on a woman's likelihood of having breast cancer. 19, 20 The message is that Bayesian processing can and should be built directly into test reports and our electronic health records (EHRs). 18 Third, we need to mobilize PCPs' reasoning powers (Kahneman's System 2), even if they will still have trouble recognizing and overcoming faulty intuitions. 1, 21, 22 We should continue to teach future and current doctors about cognitive biases in hopes that they will become more self-aware. We also need to find effective ways to help us to avoid premature closure and confirmation bias by encouraging, or even forcing, us to step back and reflect on our judgments and decisions at the beginning or at the end of the diagnostic process. Computers might help here, at least slightly 23, 24 (although whether clinicians would be willing to enter the needed data and to look at the suggestions is uncertain). Moreover, we should incentivize clinicians to think; that is, reimbursement for patient encounters should be based to a large extent on the complexity and breadth of decision making (as the IOM recommends 13 ).
Fourth, we should encourage PCPs to seek help. Trustworthy electronic sources of information should be easily accessible within EHRs and on our electronic devices (as is increasingly the case). PCPs should develop, as part of the ''medical neighborhood,'' easy access, whether verbally or electronically, to a set of specialists. Furthermore, clinicians should try to involve patients in the diagnostic reasoning process, thereby stimulating them to clarify their stories and provide new clues.
Fifth, we need to change the environment. PCPs and other physicians must avoid, as much as possible, the stress, frustration, and burnout that impede attention and reasoning. We must make good use of our clinical teams to relieve us of nonessential tasks and, in particular, to enter into the EHR the data needed to prepare patient records for decision support. Vendors must improve EHRs so that they help us, rather than hinder us, in our efforts to take good care of our patients 25, 26 ; the IOM report 13 has an excellent discussion of this. In addition, health system reforms are needed to reduce the increasing burden of tasks imposed on us and our staffs as we try to deal with patients' insurances and report on multiple ''quality'' measures.
As Blaise Pascal declared in his Pensées in 1660-1662, even if we humans are physically feeble and vulnerable, we are superior to the rest of the universe in our ability to think. ''All our dignity consists therefore in thought. It is through it that we must elevate ourselves, not through space and time, which we are unable to fill. Let us strive therefore to think well: that is the principle of morality.'' 27 Thinking well-including making accurate and timely diagnoses-is, or should be, our glory and dignity as physicians.
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